Unprecedented levels of US subprime mortgage defaults precipitated a severe global financial crisis in late 2008, plunging much of the industrialized world into a deep recession. However, the fundamental reasons for why US mortgages defaulted at such spectacular rates remain largely unknown. This paper presents empirical evidence showing that the ability to perform basic mathematical calculations is negatively associated with the propensity to default on one's mortgage. We measure several aspects of financial literacy and cognitive ability in a survey of subprime mortgage borrowers who took out loans in 2006 and 2007, and match them to objective, detailed administrative data on mortgage characteristics and payment histories. The relationship between numerical ability and mortgage default is robust to controlling for a broad set of sociodemographic variables, and is not driven by other aspects of cognitive ability. We find no support for the hypothesis that numerical ability impacts mortgage outcomes through the choice of the mortgage contract. Rather, our results suggest that individuals with limited numerical ability default on their mortgage due to behavior unrelated to the initial choice of their mortgage.
foreclosure | consumer finance | subprime loans | limited rationality I n 2007, a dramatic rise in US subprime mortgage defaults set off a global financial crisis that dragged much of the industrialized world into the most severe recession since the Great Depression (1) . As Fig. 1 shows, well over 50% of US subprime mortgages that originated in 2006 and 2007 ended up in default after 5 y, and many more had fallen behind on their payments. This was in contrast to subprime vintages in the early 2000s in which 5-y default rates reached less than 15%.
In the aftermath of the crisis, researchers and policymakers have focused on determining the sources of the explosion in mortgage defaults and appropriate policy responses to prevent such a costly crisis in the future. The vast majority of this literature has focused on the question of why mortgage lenders were willing to lend money to riskier and riskier borrowers. [For example, several influential papers have focused on the role of credit supply changes during the US housing boom, and in particular the potential role of relaxed underwriting standards in generating an expansion of mortgage credit (2) (3) (4) and inattentive actors in the financial market (5) .] Much less attention has been given to the other side of the issue: Why were so many borrowers willing to take out mortgages that they could not repay? In particular, there has been very little analysis of the role of individuals' ability to make financial decisions and to handle the relatively complicated trade-offs involved in choosing various aspects of a mortgage contract (1, 6) . Although recent research has shown that many individuals have problems answering simple questions about basic financial principals (7) (8) (9) (10) and routinely make systematic financial mistakes, such as underestimating interest rates from payment streams (11) , empirical evidence on the link between an individual's ability to make complicated financial decisions and the propensity to default on one's mortgage is still missing.
In this paper we focus on one particular aspect of financial decision making, numerical ability (NA), and examine the link between subprime mortgage borrowers' NA and the probability that they default on their mortgage payment obligations. We match individual measures of numerical and cognitive ability of subprime mortgage borrowers to administrative records that contain detailed information on their mortgage payment behavior (see Materials and Methods and SI Appendix for details). Limited cognitive and numerical abilities may impact the default risk of a mortgage borrower for several different reasons. First, limited cognitive abilities could impact an individual's choice of mortgage contract. Several studies have shown that better cognitive abilities are associated with improved ability to "think ahead" in a variety of decision-making problems (12, 13) . Thus, individuals with better cognitive abilities may be better able to anticipate future contingencies and choose a mortgage with payment streams that better accommodate those contingencies. Indeed, optimal mortgage choice turns out to be a very complicated problem with often surprising implications (14) . Furthermore, individuals are often confused about even basic mortgage terms (15) . Higher cognitive abilities and financial literacy have also been shown to result in better bargaining outcomes (16) and to a lower likelihood of being susceptible to questionable practices (17) . Thus, individuals with higher cognitive abilities may be more agile in negotiating with mortgages lenders to obtain better contract terms, such as lower interest rates and the absence of prepayment penalties. Similarly, individuals with low NA might have a harder time understanding the financial consequences of a particular type of financial product. An important example is the typical subprime adjustable-rate mortgage, which has a relatively low initial interest rate but adjusts (often upward) after a couple of years, at which point the corresponding increased mortgage payment may make it difficult to honor the debt obligation. Other examples include prepayment penalties that increase the cost of refinancing or the higher interest costs often associated with low documentation loans. Similarly, borrowers with limited NA might opt to borrow more money relative to the value of their home, which would make them more vulnerable to default when house prices decline.
Alternatively, individuals with limited NA may make choices after deciding on a specific mortgage contract that put them at higher risk of default. One possibility is that borrowers with low NA have trouble maintaining a budget in other areas of consumer spending and, as a result, experience more adverse financial scenarios. There is strong evidence from earlier studies showing that individuals with limited NA have lower savings and lower wealth, and that they are less likely to plan for retirement (7) (8) (9) . Based on this evidence, it is reasonable to infer that individuals with limited NA are prone to financial planning mistakes that may result in situations of financial duress. Poor NA also correlates with a coarser understanding of financial decisions more generally (7, 9) , such as suboptimal use of credit cards (18) , and a lower participation rate in stock markets (19) . This suggests that individuals with lower NA may make suboptimal choices in other areas of financial planning, such as a lack of sufficient insurance or self-selection into unstable employment contracts. These may render a household more vulnerable to a given financial shock and could increase the propensity of mortgage default.
Our data allow us to determine whether the impact of NA on default occurs through the choice of a particular type of mortgage product or through behavior that occurs after the time of contracting. We combine administrative data on individual mortgages with measures of NA obtained through a telephone survey. Our mortgage data, a proprietary dataset for New England, contains detailed information on the characteristics of the mortgage contracts chosen by subprime borrowers as well as the entire payment history of each mortgage. (The dataset was purchased by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston from the data vending firm Corelogic.) We supplement this information with measures of numerical and general cognitive ability through telephone interviews with these same homeowners. Using these data, we test whether variation in the choice of mortgage contracts can explain the results, by consecutively controlling for numerous mortgage attributes and determining to what extent these choices can explain the negative correlation that we find between NA and default. A serious concern in studies that use telephone surveys is response selectivity: individuals who respond to the survey may be different from those who refuse to participate, and these differences may be present in the characteristics that we are interested in as researchers. Our data allow us to examine this issue by examining whether participants in the survey had different mortgages and default rates from nonparticipants in the administrative dataset. We find no evidence of response selectivity with respect to mortgage characteristics (SI Appendix, Table S1 ).
Section 1: Results
Our empirical analysis relates mortgage delinquency to cognitive and NA while at the same time holding constant a range of control variables. We use two measures of mortgage delinquency: the fraction of months that a borrower is behind by at least one mortgage payment, which we refer to as the percentage of time delinquent; and an indicator for whether the lender initiates the foreclosure process. Based on the strong results from the previous literature, we initially focus on NA. Our NA measure is an index originally constructed by Banks and Oldfield (8) that determines the proficiency of a borrower for solving basic mathematical calculations (see SI Appendix for details). Fig. 2 displays the relationship between the NA index and the two measures of delinquency (with and without control variables). The solid line (without control variables) presents the raw probability of delinquency ( Fig. 2A) and incidence of foreclosure (Fig. 2B ). Fig. 2A shows that there is a monotonically decreasing relationship between the percentage of time spent behind on mortgage payments and NA. Borrowers in the lowest NA group on average spend almost 25% of the time in delinquency, whereas those in the highest group spend on average only 12% of the time in delinquency. A linear regression shows that the NA index is significantly correlated with delinquency (p < 0:001; SI Appendix, Tables  S6 and S7 ). In Fig. 2B , a similar relationship holds between the incidence of foreclosure and NA. Although there is only a small difference in the incidence of foreclosure between the first and second NA group, the third group is characterized by a lower incidence of foreclosure compared with the first two groups (15% vs. more than 20%), whereas the fourth and highest group is characterized by a substantially lower incidence of foreclosure compared with the third group (7% vs. 15%). In a linear regression the correlation between the NA index and the incidence of foreclosure is significant (p < 0:05; SI Appendix, Tables S6 and S7) .
To verify that this primary result is not driven by omitted socioeconomic characteristics that are correlated with NA, we reestimate the relationship adding critical independent variables: age, sex, ethnicity, education, marital status, the size of the household, time and risk preference parameters, labor market status over the previous 5 y, the household's income, a subjective measure of income volatility, FICO score, and dummy variables for whether the borrower is an investor (owner occupant as the reference group), as well as whether the mortgage is for a home purchase. This result is presented as regression-adjusted coefficients in Fig. 2 (dashed line) and is consistent with the analysis above: the implied default rates shown in the figure are unaffected and follow the same pattern, and remain statistically significant in both panels (SI Appendix, Table S7 ). The inclusion of these controls also significantly increases the R 2 of the regression from around 2% to ∼25%. The FICO score, in particular, is an important determinant of delinquency and foreclosure. The fact that the correlation between NA and delinquency does not change when the FICO score at origination is included is an important finding. It implies that the measure of NA is not just capturing the fact that borrowers who have defaulted on previous debts are more likely to default on their mortgage compared with borrowers with good credit histories. Therefore, initial creditworthiness, e.g., the initial ability to borrow to smooth out shocks, does not drive the effect of NA (for the full regression, see SI Appendix, Table S7 ). Additional robustness checks indicate that our result is also not driven by borrowers' experience as homeowners (SI Appendix, Table S8 ) and specific aspects of the geographic area or lender characteristics (SI Appendix, Table S9 ).
A concern is that other cognitive abilities related to NA may impact the propensity to default, so it is important to verify that the correlation is associated with NA specifically. Our study allows us to address the question of whether it is the specific ability to perform numerical calculations that affects default or a more general aspect of cognitive ability. We obtain a measure of verbal intelligence quotient (IQ) to proxy for general cognitive ability (20) . Included in the survey are also several questions on economic literacy in general, i.e., knowledge about inflation, and the basic mechanics of interest rates. Finally, we also use the reaction times of the survey participants to the numeracy The graphs show the cumulative default rates, measured by the issuance of a foreclosure petition, across different years on a quarterly basis. Source: own calculations using the Corelogic dataset.
questions as a proxy for general cognitive ability. All of these different measures of cognitive ability are strongly correlated, and exhibit one common factor (for details, see Materials and Methods and SI Appendix, Table S3 ). The results are displayed in Table 1 for both measures of cognitive ability. Turning to the first specification in the two columns under "Fraction of time in delinquency," which uses the fraction of time an individual is behind as the dependent variable, we see that the addition of the verbal IQ measure does not explain the association between NA and mortgage delinquency. NA remains statistically significant, whereas the addition of the verbal IQ measure to the covariate set adds little explanatory power to the regression. Adding variables that measure economic literacy and the reaction times to the NA and verbal IQ questions also has little impact on the estimation results. Thus, mortgage delinquency seems specifically associated with NA, not with general IQ levels or economic literacy. The two columns under "Foreclosure initiated (=1)" in Table 1 report the results for the initiation of foreclosure. Interestingly, although the inclusion of IQ does not diminish the coefficient associated with NA, it does display a statistically significant, negative correlation with the incidence of foreclosure. This suggests that, holding NA constant, higher IQ does not prevent households from falling behind on payments, but it does help them to avert foreclosure, perhaps because borrowers with higher IQ have better strategic skills, as indicated by earlier studies (12, 13). As discussed above, one particular channel through which NA could impact mortgage delinquency is in leading individuals to obtain mortgages with unfavorable terms given their specific financial situations. Limited NA could cause individuals to overly extend their leverage by borrowing too much, or to agree to mortgage terms for which they do not fully understand the risks Numerical Ability Groups
Frequency of foreclosure. B A Fig. 2 . Numerical ability (NA) and mortgage default. Simple relationship (solid line) along with two regression-adjusted relationships between the NA index (1 is bottom and 4 top group in terms of NA) and measure of mortgage default is shown. The dashed line shows the regression-adjusted relationship controlling for borrower characteristics [age, sex, ethnicity, education, marital status, the size of the household, time and risk preference parameters, labor market status over the previous 5 y, the household's income, the subjective measure of income volatility, FICO score, and dummy variables for whether the borrower is an investor (owner occupant as the reference group), as well as whether the mortgage is for a home purchase]. The dotted line shows the regression-adjusted relationship controlling for borrower characteristics and mortgage characteristics (fixed-rate mortgage vs. adjustable-rate mortgage, mortgage amount, presence of prepayment penalties, documentation status, initial interest rate, loan-to-value ratio, debt-to-income ratio). SEs (gray) overlap for the three models. A shows the probability of delinquency, and B shows the incidence of foreclosure. Source: own calculations. involved. This channel has received a lot of attention in policy discussions despite little hard evidence. Examples include mortgages with interest rates that are fixed for an initial period and then reset to higher adjustable rates, high prepayment penalties, or loan-to-value ratios close to 100%, which put borrowers in vulnerable positions in the event of house price declines and make it difficult to refinance. By making use of the detailed information on mortgage and borrower characteristics in the administrative dataset, it is possible to directly examine this possibility. Table 2 presents correlations between the NA index and various aspects of an individual's mortgage choice. The "Unconditional" column presents the estimated unconditional correlation between the NA index and various mortgage contract terms. The "Conditional" column shows how the correlation estimates change when the control variables included in Fig. 2 are added to the regressions. The NA index is unconditionally correlated with many of the mortgage and borrower attributes, but when the set of control variables is added, most of the correlations disappear. The lone exception is the initial interest rate, which is negatively correlated with NA (individuals with higher ability have mortgages with lower interest rates on average).
To test whether the inclusion of the mortgage terms affects the association between NA and mortgage default, we add them to the regressions underlying Fig. 2 with all of the control variables included. The results are displayed in the dotted line in Fig. 2 . They show that the inclusion of the mortgage terms does not change the qualitative pattern in the relationship between NA and mortgage default, even though some of the variables, such as the mortgage amount and initial interest rate, are strong predictors of default (SI Appendix, Table S11 ). These findings suggest that the negative correlation between NA and mortgage default cannot be explained through different choices of mortgage terms. Taken together with the previous result on the inclusion of the FICO score, they imply that NA must influence mortgage default through behavior that occurs after the choice of the mortgage contract.
Section 2: Discussion
Our analysis raises the possibility that limitations in NA may have significantly contributed to the massive amount of defaults on subprime mortgages in the recent financial crisis. To get a sense of the magnitude of the effects, we can compare the default rates across vintages in Fig. 1 . In making such a comparison, it is important to hold constant the age of the mortgages, as it is well known in the literature that default rates have a hump-shaped pattern with age. Thus, we compare default rates for mortgages that are approximately 2 y old. Default rates at the 2-y mark increased from 2% for the 2003 subprime vintage to 21% for the 2007 vintage. This difference proved to be large enough to cause mortgage-backed securities and their associated derivatives (for example, collateralized debt obligations) that were based on the cash flows from these mortgages to lose a significant fraction of their value. We see the same order of magnitude in passing from the highest NA group to the lowest. Thus, the differences in default rates predicted by NA are quantitatively important.
It is crucial in this context to determine whether this association should be interpreted as causal. There are two obstacles to such an interpretation: reverse causality and omitted variable bias. Reverse causality can be ignored in our context, as it is implausible to argue that falling behind on one's mortgage could impair one's ability to perform simple mathematical calculations. Omitted variable bias is a more serious problem, but the design of our study allows us to narrow down the possible interpretations for the association that we find between NA and mortgage defaults. First, we can rule out omitted socioeconomic characteristics, as we include a host of variables that measure such characteristics as controls. Second, we can rule out the idea that other, more general forms of cognitive ability such as general IQ or economic literacy drive the results. Finally, we have shown that the association is not caused by different choices of mortgage attributes that may be correlated with NA and mortgage default at the same time. This suggests that the negative correlation between NA and mortgage default is likely driven by some aspect of individual behavior that occurs after the mortgage is originated. Possibilities include spending and savings patterns or suboptimal investments made with respect to other financial contracts that impact borrowers' ability to repay their mortgages. Links between these behaviors and cognitive abilities, including NA, have been previously documented (7) (8) (9) .
Two policy implications emerge from our study. An important goal of policy is to avoid elevated levels of mortgage defaults and foreclosures because dislocation can be costly at many levels. It has often been argued that complicated mortgage products like hybrid-adjustable rate mortgages are an important culprit in causing mortgage defaults. Indeed, such mortgages have been shown to have higher default rates in other studies (21, 22) . Our results suggest that they are not the only important factor for the elevated default rates associated with subprime mortgages. We find that differences in NA play just as important a role quantitatively in terms of predicting the incidence of mortgage default and that this effect is also present for individuals who hold fixedrate mortgages. Thus, imposing restrictions on the set of available mortgage products that could be offered to borrowers would likely not solve the problem of elevated mortgage defaults during periods of declining house prices such as the one we recently experienced.
Second, our results indicate possibly large benefits from increased financial education of homeowners. Recent studies have found that changes in financial education curricula in high schools have important effects on financial decisions later in life (23, 24) , that foreclosure counseling can reduce incidences of foreclosure (25) , and that mathematical skills in general may be more malleable and less genetically driven than previously thought (26) . If financial education can reduce suboptimal financial decision making, this could have profound effects on household behavior, as suggested by our results. Our study is correlational and puts this hypothesis in play. Future research should address it by running a randomized study, offering financial education to some homeowners, but not to others, and subsequently tracking their performance. The table displays the estimated correlation between the NA index and various mortgage attributes from regressions in which the mortgage attribute is the dependent variable. The "Unconditional" column reports the regression coefficient without control variables. The "Conditional" column reports the regression coefficient with all of the controls from Fig. 2 included. "DV" indicates variables that are dichotomous. OLS estimates are reported. The single asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Materials and Methods
Subjects and Sampling. The sample is composed of borrowers that took out subprime mortgages in 2006 and 2007. We attempted to contact borrowers by both phone and mail. Conditional on reaching a borrower and receiving an agreement to participate, the survey was conducted via telephone. Because we have mortgage information for all borrowers in the administrative data, we can show that responders are not different from nonresponders in terms of mortgage terms and outcomes (including the probability of being in default). See SI Appendix for further details of our sampling design and for summary statistics.
Measure of Numerical and Cognitive Ability. The core part of the survey asks five questions that test individuals' NA (8) . Following ref. 8 , we divide people into four groups in terms of their ability (i.e., the NA index goes from 1 indicating the bottom group to 4 indicating the top group). To measure general cognitive ability, we use a verbal fluency test that is highly correlated with IQ (20, 27) . Additionally, we ask two financial literacy questions (7) and measure individuals' response time to the NA questions. SI Appendix provides details and reports correlations of the different measures in SI Appendix, Table S3 . Additionally, the survey allows us to obtain information about individuals' time and risk preferences, homeownership experience, and other sociodemographic information.
Mortgage Data. The administrative dataset contains objective information about mortgage and borrower characteristics and payment behavior. For the main analysis, we analyze two measures that incorporate delinquency from the origination of the mortgage until March 2009: The first measure of delinquency measures the fraction of time a borrower is behind by at least one mortgage payment. This measure captures the amount of time during which a household is unable or unwilling to meet the promised mortgage payments. The second measure is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if foreclosure proceedings have been initiated by the lender. SI Appendix also shows analysis for a third outcome variable. The dataset also has extensive loan-level information on mortgage characteristics, including interest rates (initial levels and changes over time), documentation levels, payment histories, loan-to-value ratios, and various other lending terms. In addition, it contains some information regarding borrower characteristics, such as the borrower's credit score and debt-to-income ratio at origination (borrower's monthly debt payment divided by his or her monthly income).
Statistical Methods. The primary empirical specification in the analysis takes the following form:
where D i corresponds to either a measure of delinquency (as in the underlying regressions of Fig. 1 ) or specific details of the mortgage (as in 
I. Materials and Methods
This section provides a detailed discussion of the sample and survey design. First, the mortgage data and the pool of mortgage borrowers that the survey sample is drawn from is described, and potential sample selection biases are discussed. Then, the details of the survey procedure and the questions of interest are presented.
A. Mortgage Data and Sampling
In order to obtain objective measures of mortgage delinquency and default, the survey sample is constructed from data that combines two micro-level mortgage datasets. The first is a loan-level dataset constructed and maintained by Corelogic (formerly FirstAmerican LoanPerformance). Corelogic collects information on individual mortgages that are used as collateral for non-agency, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and sold to investors on the secondary mortgage market. The sample comes from data that the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston purchased in mid-2007, which covers Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island from the late-1990s through March 2009. The dataset contains extensive loan-level information on mortgage characteristics, including interest rates (initial levels and changes over time), documentation levels, payment histories, loan-to-value ratios, and various other lending terms. It also contains some information regarding borrower characteristics, such as the borrower's credit score and debt-to-income ratio at origination (borrower's monthly debt payment divided by his or her monthly income). Finally, the Corelogic dataset identifies the type of MBS each loan was packaged into -subprime, Alt-A, or prime.
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The second source of data used in this study was supplied by The Warren Group, a private Boston firm that has been tracking real estate transactions in New England for more than a century. The Warren Group collects publicly available real estate transaction records that are filed at Registry of Deeds offices throughout New England, and have maintained an electronic database of these records for the past twenty years. The data includes the universe of purchase-money mortgages, refinance mortgages, home equity loans, home equity lines of credit (only information on capacities and no information on utilization rates), and purchase deeds (including foreclosure deeds) transacted in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Unlike the Corelogic data, this dataset contains the precise location of each property and the exact names of the buyers and sellers of each property as well as the names of the mortgage borrowers. These data make it possible to construct a history of mortgage transactions for a household in a given property. In other words, with the Warren Data it is possible to follow households in the same house across different mortgages. Since the data include information on all mortgage liens and the sale price for each property, it is also possible to construct a precise measure of the cumulative loan-to-value ratio at the time of purchase, 2 and to keep track of the total number of mortgages obtained by each homeowner.
The sample of first-lien mortgages contained in subprime MBS that were originated in 2006 and 2007 from the Corelogic dataset were matched to the Warren Group registry data. The match was based on the zip code of the property (Corelogic data contains only the identity of the zip code where the property is located), the date of mortgage origination, the amount of the mortgage, whether the mortgage was for purchase or refinance, and the identity of the institution that originated the mortgage. The match rate was approximately 45 percent, and left us with a sample of more than 74,000 mortgages.
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Mortgages from this matched dataset were randomly selected to construct the sample of borrowers for the survey. Two different strategies were used to contact borrowers: 1) Cold-calls involved calling borrowers by phone, which was possible as each borrower's name and address is contained in the Warren Group data. This information was then used as an input into an internet search engine (USAPeopleSearch.com) to find each borrower's phone number(s). 2) Mail-ins involved mailing invitations to participate in the survey to the addresses listed in the Warren Group data.
The Cold-call strategy, entailed calling a total of 3,523 borrowers 4 in the summer of 2008 (June -August). The borrower was positively identified in approximately one-third of the cases (1,087). 5 In half of those cases it proved impossible to speak to the actual borrower, 2 The Corelogic data has only sporadic information on the presence of second liens, and thus does not allow for the construction of accurate cumulative loan-to-value ratios. 3 The main issue that contributed to the low match rate was the inconsistent definition of dates between the two datesets. The date listed in Corelogic is the date of origination, while the date listed in the Warren Group data is the date that the mortgage document was recorded. It usually takes at least a few days for documents to be filed in the Registry of Deeds offices (sometimes a few weeks), and thus, these two dates do not match. Therefore, we were forced to use a date range in the matching algorithm, and consequently often found cases of multiple mortgages of the same amount, originated in the same zip code, in a given date range. We were forced to throw out these cases of multiple matches. The identity of the originating institution often helped in these cases, but unfortunately the Corelgoic data contain only sparse information on this variable. The matched sample of mortgages appears to be quite representative of both the Corelogic and Warren Group datasets based on observable mortgage, property and borrower characteristics. 4 Often multiple phone numbers were found for each borrower in the data, so the actual number of phone numbers called was much larger than the number of borrowers.
5 For another one-third the phone line was not working. For the last one-third, a working and thus, a response to the interview request was never received. 6 In 296 cases the borrower was contacted, but he or she refused to participate in the survey, 7 and in 253 cases the borrower was contacted and he or she agreed to participate in the survey. Based on these statistics, two participation rates are reported for the Cold-calls: Of the borrowers that were directly contacted, 46.1 percent agreed to participate in the survey; of the borrowers that were matched to a correct phone number, 10.5 percent agreed to participate. The Mail-in strategy entailed mailing almost 5,000 invitation letters to borrowers for whom phone contact information could not be obtained. The invitation letter was one page (two-sided) and contained a brief description of the survey and the survey conductors (and was signed by the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston). A small response card was also included that contained a question asking if the borrower would be interested in participating in the survey, and included space for borrowers who agreed to participate to list working phone numbers and the best times of day to call. In addition, a response envelope and postage was included. In the vast majority of cases (98.3 percent), a response was not received. For the cases in which a response was received, an attempt was made to call the borrower to conduct the interview. Of the borrowers that were subsequently contacted, approximately 92 percent agreed to participate in the survey (70 percent of the borrowers for whom a correct address could be verified).
Sample selection bias is always a serious concern in surveys such as this one. Since information about observable mortgage and borrower characteristics for all of the borrowers is available in the Corelogic and Warren Group datasets, it is possible to test whether there is sample selection on those observable characteristics. According to sample statistics listed in Table S1 , there is little evidence of sample selection on observable characteristics. The table compares average characteristics between the respondents and non-respondents for both the Cold-Calls sample and the Mail-In sample. Only the mortgage amount for the phone sample and initial interest rate for the mailing is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. All the other differences are not statistically significant at even the 10 percent level. Importantly, information about the foreclosure rate of all individuals is also available, and there is no difference in the probability of foreclosure after the mailing went out between line was reached, but it was not possible to verify that the phone number corresponded to the borrower in the data either because nobody picked up the phone or because an answering machine was reached (it was not possible to identify the borrower from the answering machine message, and furthermore the borrower never responded to a message that was left on the machine). 6 In most of these cases either a message was left on an answering machine, or another member of the household answered, but the actual borrower was not available. 7 This includes cases in which the borrower agreed to participate at a later date, but never followed through on that agreement. respondents and non-respondents. Furthermore, a more formal statistical test of sample selection is conducted, and the results support the findings from Table S1 . 8 While it does not appear that selection into the survey sample is an issue, the timing of the survey raises some important issues. The survey was conducted in the summer of 2008 between June and August, while the borrowers chosen for the survey obtained their mortgages in 2006 and 2007. August 2007 is the last month that a mortgage was originated in the survey sample, quite simply because the subprime mortgage market had completely shut down at that point and no new mortgages were originated. This means that the subprime borrowers taking the survey had been paying their respective mortgages for at least 10 months and up to 32 months (for mortgages originated in January 2006). In addition, one of the requirements imposed for inclusion into the sample was that each borrower not be in the foreclosure process at the time that the survey was conducted. This requirement was made because of the increased difficulty in contacting borrowers in foreclosure. Many of those borrowers are either likely not living in the home anymore, or if they are, will likely refuse to answer phone calls or mail requests. Because of this design feature, the results in this study are not necessarily representative of all subprime mortgage borrowers. Many subprime borrowers defaulted on their loans and experienced foreclosure within the first year of origination. The average number of months to default for all subprime mortgages originated in 2006 and 2007 in the LP dataset for which the servicer has initiated foreclosure proceedings is slightly less than 18. More than one-quarter of the defaults occurred within one year of origination.
In the end, 339 individuals responded to the survey and constitute the main sample. The last two columns in Table S1 display summary statistics of the detailed information in the Corelogic data on respondents' mortgage characteristics. The statistics are consistent with what one might expect in a sample of subprime mortgage borrowers. The average FICO score of 632 is relatively low, the majority of borrowers have adjustable-rate mortgages 8 To test for potential sample selection bias on observables we estimate for each observable outcome measure k (see Table S1 ), the equation
where α k is the constant for outcome k, γ k is the difference in the outcome if the individual was a respondent (and R i = 1), and β k is the difference in the outcome if individual i was a cold call (and CC i = 1). Finally, k i is the residual for outcome k. The k equations in (1) are estimated by seemingly unrelated variables, thus allowing the residuals k i to be correlated across outcomes within individuals. The hypothesis γ k = 0 is then tested for all k outcome measures. The p-value of the corresponding χ 2 -test is p = 0.51, which suggests little to no evidence of selectivity into the survey on these 10 important variables.
(two-thirds), and the average debt-to-income ratio (ratio of the summation of all monthly debt payments to the monthly mortgage payment) of 0.42 is relatively high, which suggests that this group of borrowers is characterized by heavy debt burdens. Notes: The first part of the table shows differences of various mortgage characteristics between R and NR (NR-R) and p-values of t-tests of whether the differences are statistically significant. The information is based on 3,615 observations for the Cold Calls and 4,995 observations for the Mail-Ins. The information about Debt-to-Income Ratio is missing for a few observations in the Warren Group data. To compare Foreclosure after mailing went out we focus on individuals who were never in foreclosure between the origination and the date we contacted them. For some of the borrowers who were "current" on their mortgage when we contacted them, a foreclosure petition had been filed before and they may have already been in the process of moving out. The last two columns show summary statistics of all respondents (N = 339).
B. The Survey
The survey contains four important parts: 1) Measures of two aspects of individuals' financial literacy, numerical ability and basic economic literacy, and a measure of general cognitive ability. 2) Measures of time and risk preferences. 3) Questions about the details of the mortgage contract (we already know much of this information from the micro datasets) and the experience of shopping for the mortgage. 4) An extensive list of sociodemographic characteristics that complements information from the Corelogic and Warren Group datasets.
On average, the survey took about 20 minutes to complete, and individuals were compensated $20 for their participation.
B.1. Financial Literacy and Cognitive Ability
The first measure of financial literacy, which is the primary focus of this study, determines the proficiency of a respondent for solving basic mathematical calculations. Participants were asked the following five questions originally developed by (1) . The questions are as follows:
1. In a sale, a shop is selling all items at half price. Before the sale, a sofa costs $300.
How much will it cost in the sale?
2. If the chance of getting a disease is 10 per cent, how many people out of 1,000 would be expected to get the disease? To construct an index of numerical ability, (1) suggest dividing individuals into four separate groups based on the responses to the five questions. A borrower is placed into the first group corresponding to the lowest level of numerical ability if he answers questions 1, 2, and 3 incorrectly or answers question 1 correctly, but answers questions 2, 3, and 4 incorrectly. The second group is made up of borrowers who answer at least one of the first four questions incorrectly (the outcome of the fifth question is not considered for the first or second groups). The third group contains borrowers who answered questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 correctly, but answered question 5 incorrectly. Finally, borrowers who answered all five questions correctly are placed into the fourth group. Table S2 shows the distribution of the numerical ability index in the survey sample as well as the distribution from the Banks and Oldfield paper. Approximately 16 percent of borrowers fall into the lowest group, 54 percent into the second group, 17 percent into the third group, and 13 percent into the highest group. Despite being characterized by a very different group of individuals, the distribution of the index in the Banks and Oldfield study is very similar to the distribution in the survey sample.
It is important in this context to distinguish between the effects of financial literacy and the more general notion of cognitive ability. To do so, we use a verbal fluency measure first introduced by (2). Participants were asked: " In the next 90 seconds, name as many animals as you can think of. The time starts now." The number of animals named is highly correlated with IQ (e.g. 2). The reason for this is that intelligence is highly correlated with the ability to retrieve known information. As most people know hundreds, if not thousands of animals, the question reveals how easy it is to retrieve that information. Obviously, the ability to name animals in English also depends on individuals' English language skills, which is elicited separately (see below). In the economics literature, (3) also use this question to measure cognitive ability. Figure S1 compares the distribution of responses in the survey sample to the distribution in their study, which used a representative sample of the German population. The shape of the distributions is very similar.
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In addition to the measure of financial literacy that focuses on respondents' numerical ability, we measure respondents' basic understanding of economic mechanisms using two questions from (4). (4) refer to these as "basic financial literacy" questions, but in our opinion they measure an individual's understanding of basic economic concepts, and thus we refer to them as questions that measure "economic literacy."
1. Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this account? More than today, exactly the same as today, or less than today?
2. Suppose that in the year 2020, your income has doubled and prices of all goods have doubled too. In 2020, how much will you be able to buy with your income? More than today, exactly the same as today, or less than today?
In the survey sample, approximately 79 percent of borrowers answered the first question correctly, and 74 percent answered the second question correctly, while 60 percent answered both questions correctly. These results are very similar to those obtained by (4) .
As an additional measure of cognitive ability, the average time it took the participants to respond to the (1) numerical ability questions was calculated. The time was measured from the moment the interviewer had finished reading the question to the moment an answer was given by the respondent. Table S3 displays the correlations between all of the measures of cognitive ability and financial literacy. There is a strong, positive correlation between the measures of financial literacy and cognitive ability as measured by the verbal fluency question. There is also a strong, negative correlation between the measures of financial literacy and verbal fluency with the response times to the numerical ability questions. Individuals who responded more quickly to these questions achieved higher scores.
10
A more formal factor analysis reveals one common factor among the five variables. Only the first eigenvalue is greater than one, while all others are almost exactly equal to zero. Finding one common component to different measures of intelligence is quite common, and has been found in many other studies (See, e.g., 5; 6).
B.2. Time and Risk Preferences
To measure time and risk preferences, respondents were asked to make a number of hypothetical choices that made it possible to calculate their discount factors and risk aversion parameters. Similar to experimental measures of time preferences (see, e.g., 7; 8), individuals were asked to decide on a monetary amount that makes them indifferent between receiving the amount immediately versus waiting x months for a larger monetary amount. The answers to these questions allows for the calculation of individual discount factors. Individuals were asked to make such intertemporal trade-offs for the present versus both x = 6 months and x = 12 months. The two different time frames make it possible to construct a measure of whether individuals have dynamically inconsistent time preferences (e.g., 9). As can be seen in panel A in Table S4 , which displays summary statistics of key variables from the survey, the average discount factor in our sample is 0.96 (over one month) and 80 percent of our sample exhibits dynamically consistent time preferences, similar to (7) . In addition, the borrowers were asked to assess their own level of impatience on a 11-point scale from 0 corresponding to "very impatient" to 10 corresponding to "very patient." The measure of impatience that is based on the set of hypothetical choices is primarily used in the empirical work, but the results are largely unchanged if the subjective scale is used instead.
The measure of risk aversion also follows standard experimental strategies (e.g., 10). Participants were asked to hypothetically choose between a certain payoff and a 50-50 chance of receiving a good or bad payoff:
Which would you prefer: A mortgage for which you paid $1000 per month for the next thirty years, or a mortgage, in which, after two years the payment is either $500 or $1100 with equal chance?
If the participant accepted the uncertain lottery, the high payment of the uncertain mortgage was raised by increments of $100. The payoff at which the participant switches to the safe mortgage is used as the measure of risk tolerance. The mean switching amount (see Table S4 ) was $ 1184, revealing a substantial degree of risk aversion. In addition, participants were asked to assess their own level of risk tolerance on a scale from 0 to 10 as in (11) . As with the self-assessed impatience measure, the second risk measure does not require any numerical skills. Nevertheless, the risk measure based on the set of hypothetical choices (most related to experimental risk measures) is primarily used in the empirical work, but the results are robust to using the self-reported scale measure.
B.3. Socio-demographics
The survey contains a number of detailed questions about socio-demographic characteristics and information about household income and employment status. Participants were asked about their race and ethnicity, gender, age, place of birth, amount of time spent in the United States, marital status, number of children, education level, and proficiency with the English language (scale from 0 corresponding to a "beginner" to 10 corresponding to a "native speaker"). In addition, questions were included to measure the amount of household income, the number of family members that contribute to household income, and the volatility of household income (on a three-point scale with 1 signifying that "it's been pretty stable"; 2 signifying "it has gone up and down a little over the last few years"; and 3 indicating that "it has gone up and down a lot over the last few years"). Finally, participants were asked about their current employment status and the number of times that they had been out of work over the previous five years.
Panel B in Table S4 presents summary statistics of the socio-demographic information. Approximately one-third of the respondents are minority (defined here as not white), and the split between males and females is about 50-50. The average age of respondents is 47 and their average household income is $80 thousand, which is surprisingly high for a sample of subprime borrowers.
11 Almost 84% of respondents were born in the United States, and almost three-quarters have more than a high school education.
B.4. Mortgage Experience
As we discussed above it is possible to obtain information on respondents' previous experience in mortgage markets. The Warren Group data allows one to calculate the number Notes: Based on 339 observations. 14 of mortgages obtained since the home purchase (going back to January 1987), which allows one to calculate the number of mortgages taken out by each household before their current subprime loan. 12 This information is supplemented with additional proxies for borrowers' experience with mortgages and their search behavior prior to obtaining their current mortgage. The survey asks participants whether they were first-time homebuyers, whether they had taken a home buying class or had received counseling, if they obtained information about mortgage pricing before obtaining their loan, and if they had, how they obtained the information (internet, relative, friend, etc.). According to panel C of Table S4 , more than half (55%) of the sample are first-time homebuyers, less than 10% took a home counseling class before purchasing their house, while 60% reported that they shopped around for a mortgage.
C. Measures of Mortgage Delinquency
Using the Corelogic mortgage performance data, three different measures of mortgage delinquency were created (two are reported in the main text). All measures incorporate delinquency from the origination of the mortgage until March 2009 (the latest update provided by Corelogic). 13 The first measure of delinquency measures the fraction of time a borrower is behind by at least one mortgage payment. This measure captures the amount of time during which a household is unable or unwilling to meet the promised mortgage payments. For example, if a household missed its very first payment and made all future payments on time, this measure would consider that the household was behind in each period until that first payment is made. The second measure of mortgage delinquency is the fraction of mortgage payments missed. This variable is an explicit measure of the extent of delinquency. For example, a borrower who has had a mortgage for 12 months and who has missed 6 payments would be assigned a value of 50 percent for this measure, while a borrower who has had the mortgage for the same amount of time, but who has only missed 3 payments, would be assigned a value of 25 percent.
The thirs measure is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of one if foreclosure proceedings have been initiated by the lender. Normally, foreclosure proceedings are initiated when a borrower is 120 days delinquent on their mortgage (or equivalently is 4 payments behind). 14 12 Mortgage information is only available for the current property. 13 Restricting the time period until summer 2008 when we conducted the survey does not materially affect the results.
14 One of the participation criteria was not being in foreclosure at the time of the survey. Table S5 contains information on the distributions of the three delinquency measures. The average borrower in the sample was behind on their payments 20 percent of the time.
Half of the borrowers in the sample were delinquent more than 7 percent of the time while 10 percent of the borrowers were delinquent more than 60 percent of the time. Almost 20 percent of the borrowers in the sample had been in the state of foreclosure at some point in their mortgage experience.
But, there are a few instances in which a borrower had been in foreclosure in the period before the survey was administered, but then had recovered by the time of the survey. These borrowers were included in the survey sample.
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II. Empirical Specification
The primary empirical specification takes the following form:
where D i corresponds to the first two measures of delinquency discussed above, the percent of time spent in delinquency and the percent of mortgage payments missed, for household i. The term N A i represents the numerical ability group of household i, x i represents a vector of control variables, and i is the residual. The equation is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) 15 , and potential heteroskedasticity in the standard errors is taken into account by estimating robust standard errors. A probit specification is estimated for the second measure of delinquency, the initiation of foreclosure proceedings,
where F i takes the value of one if foreclosure proceedings have been initiated on the borrower and zero otherwise, and Φ() is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
III. Supportive Empirical Analysis
A. Table S6 and Table S7 : Main Findings With and Without Control Variables
In the paper we discuss the following results which relate to Figure 1 in the main text:
• Table S6 shows that the extent of delinquency and foreclosure is monotonically increasing in numerical ability when a specification that includes a separate dichotomous variable for each numerical ability group is employed as in Figure 1 .
• Table S7 displays the coefficient estimates from the linear regressions (columns (1)) and the estimated marginal effects from the probit model of foreclosure starts (column (3)). They indicate that, as suggested by the figure, the correlations between numerical ability and the delinquency measures are positive and statistically significant.
• In columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8) and (9) of Table S6 and in Table S7 we stepwise add age, gender, ethnicity, education, marital status, the size of the household, time and risk preference parameters, labor market status over the previous five years, the household's income, the subjective measure of income volatility, FICO score, and dummy variables for whether the borrower is an investor (owner occupant as the reference group), as well as whether the mortgage is for a home purchase (refinance is the reference group left out of the regression). The coefficient estimates are unaffected, and remain statistically significant in all specifications. The inclusion of these controls significantly increases the R 2 of the regression from around 2 percent to approximately 25 percent. The FICO score, in particular, is an important determinant of delinquency and default. The fact that the correlation between numerical ability and delinquency does not change when the FICO score at origination is included is an important finding. 16 It implies that the measure of numerical ability is not just capturing the fact that borrowers who have defaulted on previous debts are more likely to default on their mortgage compared to borrowers with good credit histories. Therefore, initial creditworthiness, i.e. the ability to borrow to smooth out shocks, doesn't drive the effect of numerical ability.
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• All the conclusions with respect to the impact of numerical ability are independent of the specific measure of mortgage delinquency. We use the fraction of time spent in delinquency, the fraction of payments missed or the filing of a foreclosure petition, and always arrive at the same conclusion. Notes: Regression coefficients are reported in columns (1) - (4). Marginal effects from probit models are reported in columns (5) - (6) . Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns (1) -(4). All specifications contain the full set of control variables as in Table S7 . Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 Notes: Robust standard errors in columns (1) -(6). * * * , * * , * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively. Regression coefficients are reported in columns (1) - (6) . Marginal effects from probit model are reported in columns (7) - (9).
B. Robustness Table S8: Prior Experience in Mortgage Markets
Experience in mortgage markets may also impact mortgage repayment behavior. A borrower who has obtained numerous previous mortgages may have a better idea of the type of product that best fits their financial situation. In the paper, we discuss the following results:
• Table S8 adds the number of previous mortgages obtained by the borrower to the control set. In addition an indicator for first-time homebuyers, as well as a number of variables collected in the survey pertaining to the amount of information the individual collected before signing the mortgage contract are included as control variables.
• Results in Table S8 show that the correlation between numerical ability and mortgage delinquency and default is not affected. This holds for all three measures of mortgage delinquency. Notes: Regression coefficients are reported in columns (1) and (2). Marginal effects from probit models are reported in column (3). Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns (1) and (2) . All specifications contain the full set of control variables as in Table S7 . Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 C. Robustness Table S9 : Geographic Area and Mortgage Lenders
In the paper we mention two further robustness tests that deal with that our measure of numerical ability could be correlated with (1) with some neighborhood characteristic like income or education that impacted mortgage default rates when house prices began to fall. For example, one of the stylized facts of the housing crisis is that house prices were more volatile (on both the upside and downside) in poorer neighborhoods with more subprime lending, and thus greater mortgage defaults and foreclosures. (2) Individuals with low numerical ability might choose mortgage companies that provide poor support for their mortgage borrowers. It is therefore important to control for mortgage lender or servicer treatment effects. Table S9 shows that the results are robust to . . .
• including a full set of town/city fixed effects into our specifications. The results are displayed in columns (1), (4), and (7) for each of the measures of delinquency, respectively. The inclusion leads to a large increase in the R 2 , confirming that regional variation is important in explaining variation in mortgage delinquency, as found in many other studies (12; 13; 14) . However, with 175 town fixed effects, the large increase likely also reflects the fact that in many towns, we observe few borrowers. But, the correlation between numerical ability and delinquency remains significant and the point estimate increases.
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• including originator (42) and servicer (27) fixed effects to the baseline specification in the remaining Columns. The additional controls increase the R 2 , but again leave the coefficient estimate associated with numerical ability unchanged.
• All of these conclusions hold for all three of our measures of mortgage delinquency. 18 We also estimated a specification in which we included the cumulative amount of house price appreciation experienced between the time the mortgage was originated and the time the survey was conducted. This controls for some of the cross-sectional dispersion in house prices that had developed over the course of the financial crisis. The results are robust to such a specification. Notes: Regression coefficients are reported in columns (1) - (6) . Marginal effects from probit models are reported in columns (7) - (9) . Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns (1) - (6) . All specifications contain the full set of control variables as in Table S7 . Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 D. Table S10 : Numerical Ability or Cognitive Ability?
In the paper we discuss the following results:
• In columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table S10 , the verbal IQ measure is included in the estimation. Its inclusion does not affect the magnitude or statistical significance of the estimated coefficient associated with financial literacy. The verbal IQ measure, conditional on the numerical ability measure, is not correlated with the first two measures of delinquency (percent of time behind, and percent of payments behind). However, it does enter significantly into the probit model for the initiation of the foreclosure process. An increase of one standard deviation in the verbal IQ measure (8 points), is associated with a 4.8 percentage point decrease in the foreclosure rate. An important difference between foreclosure and the other two delinquency measures is that foreclosure is initiated by the lender. One possible interpretation of this finding is that lenders may be less likely to foreclose on an intelligent person who is behind, and that this is picked up by our measure of IQ.
• Columns (2), (4), and (6) display the results when the measures of economic literacy and the response times are included in the set of control variables. They are not correlated with any of the three measures of delinquency, and do not affect the point estimate of the numerical ability measure.
• All of these conclusions hold for all three of our measures of mortgage delinquency. Notes: Regression coefficients are reported in columns (1) -(4). Marginal effects from probit models are reported in columns (5) - (6) . Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns (1) -(4). All specifications contain the full set of control variables as in Table S7 . Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 E. Table S11 : Control for Mortgage Terms
In the text we mention the following regressions and results:
• Table S11 contains estimation results when mortgage and borrower characteristics are included in the set of control variables. Columns (1), (3), and (5) display the results when differences in contract terms are included. The control variables do not add to the explanatory power of the baseline specification and, consequently, leave the point estimate of the numerical ability index and its standard error, essentially unchanged.
• In columns (2), (4) and (6), LTV and DTI ratios at origination are added to the set of controls. The two variables are not correlated with the delinquency measure, but are correlated with the foreclosure measure. But, more importantly, the inclusion of both variables does not affect the magnitude or statistical significance of the correlation between numerical ability and mortgage delinquency and default.
• All of these conclusions hold for all three of our measures of mortgage delinquency. Notes: Regression coefficients are reported in columns (1) -(4). Marginal effects from probit models are reported in columns (5) - (6) . Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns (1) -(4). All specifications contain the full set of control variables as in Table S7 . Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 F. Table S12 : The estimation partialing out the mortgage conditions for Figure 2 • In Table S12 , we display the coefficient estimates on which we base the profile displayed in Figure 2 in the main text. The results display the same overall pattern as in Table  S11 . Notes: Regression coefficients are reported in columns (1) -(3). Robust standard errors in parentheses specifications contain the full set of control variables as in Table S11 , columns (2) , (4) and (6), respectively.
Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
